

Is Sufficient Information Available to Develop Theater Engagement Plans?

**A Monograph
by
MAJ Michael A. Tate
United States Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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In 1997, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed the five geographic combatant Commander in Chiefs (CINC) to formally link their regional operational engagement objectives with the national strategic objectives by developing theater engagement plans (TEP). The intent of TEP is to act as a deterrence by strengthening allied and friendly nations against external and internal threat, reduce causes of internal and external instability, assist in the development of host nation institutions that foster legitimacy, and encourage support to U.S. policies. Although TEP has been in existence for almost four years, TEP is still evolving both in the sense of a planning process and product. Currently there are no formal TEP joint terms or acronyms in joint publications because the joint staff is still developing TEP both conceptually and administratively. This monograph explores the ongoing evolution of TEP and the apparent paucity of information relating to TEP to determine if there is sufficient information available to develop TEP. Three criteria are used to answer the monograph question: sufficiency of national policy, doctrine and country and regional information. These criteria provide a lens through which to examine information requirements versus sufficiency to developing TEP. Because a planner develops operational engagement activities as part of TEP for individual countries, the monograph analyzes the sufficiency of information for developing TEP using Taiwan as a case study. The monograph has four chapters. The first chapter defines the problem with information relating to TEP and examines sufficiency of national policy and doctrine relating to TEP. Chapters two and three examine criteria for evaluating a country and determine their relevance and sufficiency of information for TEP. The monograph concludes by analyzing information requirements versus information sufficiency and identifies implications for developing TEP and for the PACOM staff charged with developing TEP for Taiwan.

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ABSTRACT

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In 1997, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed the five geographic combatant Commander in Chiefs (CINC) to formally link their regional operational engagement objectives with the national strategic objectives by developing theater engagement plans (TEP). The intent of TEP is to act as a deterrence by strengthening allied and friendly nations against external and internal threat, reduce causes of internal and external instability, assist in the development of host nation institutions that foster legitimacy, and encourage support to U.S. policies.

Although TEP has been in existence for almost four years, TEP is still evolving both in the sense of a planning process and product. Currently there are no formal TEP joint terms or acronyms in joint publications because the joint staff is still developing TEP both conceptually and administratively. This monograph explores the ongoing evolution of TEP and the apparent paucity of information relating to TEP to determine if there is sufficient information available to develop TEP.

Three criteria are used to answer the monograph question: sufficiency of national policy, doctrine and country and regional information. These criteria provide a lens through which to examine information requirements versus sufficiency to developing TEP. Because a planner develops operational engagement activities as part of TEP for individual countries, the monograph analyzes the sufficiency of information for developing TEP using Taiwan as a case study.

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CHAPTER ONE

Within their capabilities, therefore, our Armed Forces are committed to peacetime military engagement as the best way of reducing sources of conflict and preventing local crises from escalating, and shaping the international environment.¹

General Hugh Shelton, CJCS

In 1997, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed the five geographic combatant Commander in Chiefs (CINC) to formally link their regional operational engagement activities with the national strategic objectives by developing peacetime theater engagement plans (TEP).² The CJCS' intent for the TEP was for the CINC to shape his theater with the primary objective of obviating the need for the U.S. to respond to future crisis.³ The CINCs view TEP as an important instrument to strengthen their respective positions to obtain forces and capabilities required to implement their theater strategies. Although the CJCS and the respective CINCs view TEP as a valuable tool, there may be a paucity of information available to develop TEP.

Mr. Stuart D. Lyon, instructor of theater engagement planning at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, argues there are no formal TEP joint terms or acronyms in joint publications because, "TEP is still being developed both conceptually and administratively. The complexities and problems in both development and implementation are legion."⁴ *Field Manual 100-5: Operations*, defines doctrine as "the fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives."⁵ Because TEP support national objectives, insufficient doctrinal guidance would arguably make it difficult to develop effective TEP. Moreover, the

primary document governing TEP, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual*, (CJCSM) 3113.01A highlights the dynamic nature of the process. “TEP is evolving both in the sense of a planning process and product. Accordingly, it is foreseeable that changes in TEP policy and this document may need to occur out of the formal review cycle.”⁶ The complex and fluid nature of TEP may limit the amount and suitability of information available to a planner. The statements from Mr. Lyon and CJCSM 3113.01A compel the author to ask, is there sufficient doctrine and planning information to draft TEP? Additionally, what other information does a planner require for TEP, and is that information available? To answer those questions, the monograph explores whether there is sufficient information available to develop TEP.

A planner develops operational engagement activities as part of TEP for individual countries, therefore, the monograph uses Taiwan as a case to study to assist the author in determining information sufficiency for TEP, to provide the reader an example of TEP information requirements, and to identify broader implications for Pacific Command’s (PACOM) staff charged with drafting Taiwan’s TEP. Taiwan presents the author and the reader a unique opportunity to examine the sufficiency of information for TEP, because currently Taiwan is not officially part of PACOM’s TEP, however, may be within the next few years. On 2 February 2000, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act by a margin of 341 to 70. Congress designed the legislation to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capability as a measure to promote stability and maintain peace in the region.⁷ If the Senate passes the legislation, it directs military to military contact between the U.S. and Taiwan, thus making Taiwan a candidate for PACOM’s TEP. The author must warn that that Taiwan provides a

complex example for TEP, therefore, the reader should not assume that all TEP would impose similar problems for the planner. Using Taiwan as a case study, the author divides the monograph into four chapters.

Chapter one examines the sufficiency of national policy and doctrine as it relates to TEP. Because the CJSC intends TEP to link operational engagement activities to strategic objectives, sufficient national policy is important to guide the planner. The next section explores the sufficiency of doctrinal information for TEP. Doctrine guides military actions in support of national objectives. TEP involves military-to-military contact with selected countries within the CINC's region; therefore, sufficient doctrine would be imperative for the planner to develop the appropriate operational engagement activities. Chapters two and three examine criteria for evaluating a country and determine their relevance and if they provide sufficient information for developing TEP. Chapter four answers the monograph question using three criteria: sufficiency of national policy, sufficiency of doctrine, and sufficiency of information on individual countries and regions.

The first step for the planner is to determine what information is available to help develop TEP. Because TEP links operational activities to strategic objectives, the planner's most likely course of action is to review U.S. national policy

NATIONAL POLICY

There are two primary national policy sources available for TEP: the U.S. national security strategy document, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999* (NSS), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).⁸ With respect to Taiwan, the NSS states that in order to maintain peace and stability in Asia, the U.S. will continue

to adhere to the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act by maintaining strong unofficial relations between the U.S. and Taiwan.⁹ The document does not explain the significance of the Taiwan Relations Act, and as a result, the author discusses the Taiwan Relations Act in chapter three and fully analyzes the implications to TEP for Taiwan.

The JSCP attempts to provide strategic direction, in the form of prioritized regional objectives to the planner, so that he may develop operational engagement activities that support national strategic objectives.¹⁰ Both the NSS and the JSCP are intended to provide planners with strategic guidance, however, in the Spring 2000 *Parameters* article on TEP, LTC Ralph R. Steinke and COL. Brian L. Tarbet, claim that neither the NSS nor the JSCP provide sufficient information for developing TEP. The article's authors argue the 1998 NSS needed to provide a "more specific, focused guidance...." Moreover, they assert the JSCP provides vague or ill-defined prioritized objectives for the planner to use.¹¹

PACOM Implications: Taiwan is a unique country as the reader discovers throughout the monograph, therefore, the NSS does not provide a PACOM planner strategic guidance with respect to Taiwan. The one remark concerning the Taiwan Relations Act remains unclear, therefore requires additional analysis to ascertain the impact on TEP for Taiwan. Currently, national policy with respect to Taiwan is vague and incomplete and arguably does not provide the planner with sufficient information to develop TEP for Taiwan. If the Senate passes the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, the NSS must appropriately address national policy with respect to Taiwan. In the interim, the author recommends the PACOM staff resort to studying the history of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship to enhance their knowledge of U.S. policies toward the country.

TEP Implications: Although Taiwan is unique, the NSS and the JSCP also appear vague and lacks focus with respect to U.S. allies and friends. TEP links operational activities to strategic objectives, and without having clearly defined objectives, the author argues that the planner would not have sufficient information to develop appropriate military engagement activities. Future NSS' and JSCP's must provide clear, in-depth information to assist the planner to develop TEP. The author believes the only method to achieve that goal is draft the NSS and JSCP by regions. Like Taiwan, the author recommends as an interim solution that the planner resort to the study of history to augment his knowledge of national policy towards a given country.

After reviewing strategic guidance, the next step would be to explore current doctrine relating to TEP to determine how to link the operational engagement activities to the national strategic objectives

DOCTRINE

Since the CJCS directed that TEP would include operational activities that support national objectives, we could assume that there are copious amounts of doctrine relating to TEP, however, that is not the case. As stated previously, there are no formal TEP joint terms or acronyms in joint publications, because TEP is still in the development stage after four years.

There are only three doctrinal manuals that address TEP: *Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, May 2000; *Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, June 1996; and *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01A: Theater Engagement Planning* dated May 2000.¹² *Joint Publication 3-16* only provides a paragraph discussing

how a CINC may accomplish the strategic objectives (see footnote 16), whereas *Joint Publication 3-07.1* provides slightly more useful information that a planner could use. *Joint Publication 3-07.1* lists potential operational activities to bolster the military strength of allies and friends, however, since DOD published the manual in 1996 and the concept for TEP originated in 1997, the manual provides only a modicum of information to assist the planner in developing TEP.¹³ The primary source of information available to the planner is *CJCSM 3113.01A*. The manual focuses on procedures, formatting, and organization for developing TEP.¹⁴ The next section explores the contents of *CJCSM 3113.01A* to determine what information is available to the planner.

CJCSM 3113.01A: THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING

The 1997 NSS established the need to protect U.S. interests by shaping the international security environment, responding to threats and crisis and preparing for an uncertain future. To meet the shaping requirement, the CJCS directed that the JSCP task the CINCs to develop TEP for peacetime engagement. The CJCS' intent was to link the CINC's operational engagement activities with the national strategic objectives. TEP would act as deterrence by strengthening allied and friendly nations against internal and external threat; reduce causes of internal and external stability, assist in the development of host nation institutions that foster legitimacy, especially the professionalism of the military and its subordination to civil government, and encourage support to U.S. policies and priorities.¹⁵ To accomplish these objectives, the CINC plans military-to-military activities with other nations in the region. Specifically, the CINC plans for his forces to engage in combined and multilateral exercises, security assistance, combined training, combined education, military contacts, humanitarian assistance and any other military

activity involving other nations that helps build deterrence capability, demonstrates U.S. commitment, lends credibility to its alliance, enhances regional stability, and provides a crisis response capability while promoting U.S. influence in the region.¹⁶

Although the CINC and his planning staff have the responsibility for planning operational engagement activities for TEP, they plan in concert with the respective nation's U.S. Ambassador and the host nation's leadership. The CINC and his planners also must plan within the constraints of *CJCSM 3113.01A: Theater Engagement Planning*. Ambassadors permit U.S. military activities by providing in country clearances and can restrict where military forces may train or visit. Host nations must grant approval for any activities within their sovereign territory and must be willing to pay an appropriate portion of the total cost.¹⁷

The *CJCSM 3113.01A* divides the TEP process into four phases. Phase one (Initiation) furnishes the CINC with planning tasks and guidance from the JSCP. The JSCP supposedly provides the necessary planning guidance to facilitate the preparation of the TEP. In Phase II, (Strategic Concept Development) planners identify the factors affecting engagement in assigned theaters. Planners develop a strategic concept by evaluating the political, military and economic environments and threats to security and stability in individual countries and the theater overall.¹⁸ Unfortunately, the document provides little guidance on how to conduct the evaluation. *CJCSM 3113.01A* directs that the CINC update the Strategic Concept biennially. Planners also develop prioritized objectives and develop a framework of peacetime military engagement activities and resources required necessary to progress toward established objectives. Planners prioritize objectives based on tiers: Tier I is vital and must accomplish, Tier II is

important and accomplished to the extent possible and Tier III is less important and accomplished as resources permit. Phase II ends with the completion of the Strategic Concepts document.¹⁹

In Phase III, (Activity Annex Development) planners develop activity annexes for each year of the TEP covering all the operational activities needed to implement the TEP's Strategic Concept. The *CJCSM 3113.01A* directs that the CINC update the activity annex annually. The annex forecasts out seven years, but requires updating as priorities and conditions change. In Phase III, planners also identify forces and resources required to execute each operational activity. The JSCP directs the CINC to plan with only those forces in theater or those rotationally deployed to the theater. Once planners complete the activity annex document, the TEP is considered complete and sent out for review. In Phase IV (Plan Review) the joint staff, service components and supporting CINCs review the plan. Once approved by the various agencies, the CJCS provides the final approval for the TEP.²⁰

PACOM/TEP Implications : Doctrinal implications for both PACOM and TEP are similar. *CJCSM 3113.01A* is the only doctrine that provides the planner with some substantive information, but the author argues that *CJCSM 3113.01A* lacks sufficient doctrine to develop TEP. The author contends *CJCSM 3113.01A* fails to address two critical areas: how to properly conduct an evaluation of the country and how to develop and implement operational engagement activities that best support national objectives. First, the manual directs that the planner evaluate a country's external security threat, along with the military, political and economic condition of the country, but the manual provides little further guidance on how to evaluate the four areas. Lacking doctrine, the

author recommends the planner resort to what is available: *FM 101-5: Staff Organization and Planning*.

Although not a joint publication, *FM 101-5* can provide the planner with a basic mission analysis format to conduct an evaluation.²¹ Second, there are no joint tactics techniques and procedures (JTTP) in the manual.²² One of the primary objectives of TEP is to enhance a country's deterrence capability; JTTP would assist the planner to determine operational engagement activities that enhance a country's deterrence capability.²³ The U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) states, "Engagement is a...function of all our Armed Forces." "Engagement serves to...deter aggression," before a military crisis occurs.²⁴ Because doctrine is lacking why deterrence is important or how to effectively develop deterrence capabilities, the author recommends the planner resort to theory to fill the void. Therefore, the next section explores the theory of deterrence.

DETERRENCE THEORY

Deterrence in its simplest form according to Paul Krause, *Rationality and Deterrence in Theory and Practice*, "is a preventive strategy designed to avoid certain outcomes (such as war or aggression), rather than a strategy for forcing others to bend to one's will."²⁵ Deterrence is one of the primary objectives of TEP, but how does a planner effectively develop the preventive strategy that Krause discusses? National policy and doctrine fail to provide the planner sufficient information, therefore, the planner may resort to what is available: theory.

This section explores the development of deterrence, analyzes the two primary post doctrines of deterrence: massive destruction and flexible response, and determines the best method to develop deterrence for TEP.²⁶

Since World War II, the U.S. has used deterrence as a strategy to protect its sovereign territory, its vital interests and preserve the sovereignty of its allies. The postwar emphasis on deterrence was the result of lessons learned from the 1938 Munich Agreement. In the mind of postwar statesmen, the appeasement and weakness shown in Munich were the causes of World War II and therefore determined never to repeat the error.²⁷ Although deterrence theory is relatively new in the parlance of U.S. security strategy, using deterrence as a component of a nation's foreign policy for strategic security is not a new phenomenon.

Thucydides, in his *Peloponnesian War*, relates how Sparta and Athens secured allegiances from countries to discourage the other from beginning or expanding their conflict. Sun Tzu in the *Art of War* suggests to prevent the enemy from attacking show them that there is potential harm in the action.²⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz in *On War* recommends deterrence by disrupting or paralyzing enemy alliances to gain allies and affect a favorable political situation.²⁹

Neither Thucydides, Sun Tzu, nor Clausewitz could have predicted the airplane and its impact on deterrence. According to Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, who wrote the first comprehensive and in-depth assessment of deterrence in American foreign policy since World War II, the airplane was to be the catalyst for the development of twentieth-century warfare and deterrence theory.³⁰

The airplane made it possible to inflict punishment on the enemy without first having to destroy the military forces. Previously, the losing military capitulated before total defeat and its government ceded some territory as part of the peace treaty. This type of warfare precluded imposing enough punishment on the enemy's armed forces, cities and

population to deter future aggressive behavior. With the advent of strategic bombing, the theory of deterrence was conceived, because it was now possible to convince a nation that vast amounts of destruction was possible on its cities and populations using conventional or nuclear weapons, without first having destroy its military forces.³¹

Deterrence theorists distinguish the use of conventional and nuclear weapons as deterrence by denial or deterrence by punishment respectively.³² Denial includes the use of conventional weapons to cause an opponent to examine the probability of gaining his objective. Punishment involves using nuclear weapons in a massive or limited retaliation to cause an opponent to examine the possible cost of his actions.

Punishment using the doctrine of massive retaliation was the backbone of U.S. strategic security policy following the Korean War. Alexander and Smoke called massive retaliation the first systematic theory of deterrence in the Cold War era. President Dwight D. Eisenhower pronounced massive retaliation in 1953 in response to the Korean War.³³ After the Korean War, President Eisenhower wanted to convince communist countries that the U.S. would act decisively to defend allies and vital interests against communist aggression. The Administration believed that the threat of massive retaliation using nuclear weapons could counter any communist threat and outperform the conventional military in effectiveness and cost.

As a result, the Eisenhower Administration promulgated NSC 162/2 stating, “American military policy would rest on a capability of infliction massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power,” and “that the United States would consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions in the event of war.”³⁴ Massive

retaliation was arguably an appropriate form of general deterrence, but did not solve the evolving paradoxes and complexities of deterrence.³⁵

One of the complexities of massive retaliation identified by Bernard Brodie, was the enemy might find it difficult to believe that the U.S. actually intends to use nuclear weapons.³⁶ At the heart of deterrence theory is to make the adversary think that you will act irrational and in fact suicidal if necessary.³⁷ Anything less than may cause the aggressor or ally to question the commitment to carry out the threat, therefore producing a loss of credibility.

The issue of intent to use nuclear weapons was not the only problem associated with the massive retaliation doctrine. By the early the 1960s, the Soviet Union had achieved technological parity and the U.S. no longer considered nuclear war winnable.³⁸ As a result, President John F. Kennedy's Administration implemented a doctrine of flexible response. Flexible response was designed to give the president the option of using conventional forces, or if necessary nuclear weapons.

The flexible response doctrine provided a credible deterrent by having the option to deploy capable conventional forces into any theater to deter communist aggression. If conventional forces failed, the U.S. reserved the right to use nuclear weapons, but as Glenn Snyder suggests, as long as capable forces are available, denial is often more credible than punishment.³⁹ For the Kennedy Administration it meant rebuilding the conventional military forces. For the current U.S. military, it translates into having enough conventional forces capable to be a viable deterrent.

The U.S National Military Strategy claims one of key elements of deterrence is conventional warfighting capability. The same theory is the premise behind TEP.

Peacetime military engagement assists in developing a country's conventional deterrence capability, which reduces conflict and threats and deters aggression and coercion.⁴⁰ TEP is an element of U.S. strategy to shape an international environment that obviates the need for the U.S. to respond to crisis. Lacking doctrine, a planner, who understands why deterrence is important and how deterrence works, can develop operational engagement activities that support U.S. strategic objectives

PACOM Implications: A strong conventional deterrence capability accomplishes manifold tasks: it deters Taiwan's most likely threat: China. It alleviates the need for the U.S. to make a decision whether to support Taiwan in the advent of a Mainland China attack on Taiwan, and provides Taiwan with the confidence that its conventional capabilities are a deterrent, thus preventing Taiwan from developing nuclear weapons.⁴¹ One of the objectives of TEP is to maintain stability in the region and Taiwan is in a position to create weapons of mass destruction components and the means to deliver them.⁴² Taiwan with nuclear weapons would not be conducive to stability.

TEP Implications: The author considers the lack of doctrine relating to deterrence and TEP as a gross oversight. Building a deterrence capability is one of the primary focuses of TEP, however, if a planner fails to completely comprehend why deterrence is important or how to effectively develop a deterrence capability, it would arguably be difficult to develop TEP. Because doctrine does not provide JTTP concerning deterrence, the author recommends the planner use theory to enhance his knowledge. Overall, the author considers doctrinal information grossly insufficient to develop TEP.

Now that the monograph has explored national policy and doctrine, the next step is to become familiar with the dynamics of the country. *CJCSM 3113.01A* directs the planner

evaluate a country's external threat along with the military, economic and political condition of the country. The monograph's author argues that the information provided by evaluating those four areas does not present the planner with enough substance to effectively develop TEP. Therefore, the next chapter explores what the author determines as three essential areas that provide additional information needed for TEP: the history of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship; Taiwan's international legal status and U.S. alliances in PACOM's region.

CHAPTER TWO

CJCSM 3113.01A directs the planner to evaluate a country's external threat along with the military, economic and political condition of the country. However, the author argues that the guidance provided by the manual is insufficient to develop TEP. The author contends that the planner must evaluate three areas in addition to those four listed in the manual. This chapter explores the three additional areas: the history of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, Taiwan's international legal status and U.S. alliances in the region. The first section examines history of the U.S-Taiwan relationship since 1950; when U.S. interest began in Taiwan, through the present. By developing a historical framework, the planner has a greater understanding of U.S. interests, policies and obligations towards Taiwan that the NSS fails to address. The next section analyzes Taiwan's international legal status to determine potential constraints to TEP. The final section explores U.S. alliances in the PACOM region. Because of limited resources for TEP, a planner must comprehend other U.S. commitments and obligations before framing a plan for Taiwan.⁴³ Although the monograph uses Taiwan as a case study, the three areas discussed could be applicable to any country.

U.S-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP

Defense of Taiwan's security by the U.S. has its origins in the Korean War. North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950 and on 27 June 1950, President Truman ordered the U.S. 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Straits to prevent any attack on Taiwan by Mainland China. President Truman declared, "The occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific Area and to the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area."⁴⁴ President Truman felt it necessary to intervene in the Taiwan Straits because of the recently formed Sino-Soviet alliance. He feared possible future Soviet and Chinese Communist actions in the Asian-Pacific and elsewhere.

The U.S. did not have to wait long after the Korean War for Chinese Communist aggression against Taiwan. On 3 September 1954, the People's Republic of China (PRC), also called China, began a 6000-round artillery barrage onto the island of Quemoy.⁴⁵ Quemoy lies approximately nine miles off the Mainland China coast, but Taiwan had occupied and claimed the island. The bombing of Quemoy prompted President Dwight D. Eisenhower to bring Taiwan into a formal collective security system. On 2 December 1954, the U.S. and Taiwan signed a Mutual Defense Treaty. The treaty tied the U.S. into Taiwan's security regime.

The U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense arrangement did not deter Communist China; in January 1955, it militarily assaulted islands under Taiwan's control. As a response, on 29 January 1955, President Eisenhower received congressional authorization to employ U.S. forces in the area to prevent any attack on Taiwan proper. Furthermore, President Eisenhower threatened the PRC with tactical nuclear weapons to deter further PRC

aggression.⁴⁶ In 1958 and again in 1962 the PRC would display overt aggression toward Taiwan. In both cases, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to protect Taiwan's security. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security was considered strong until the presidential inauguration of Richard M. Nixon in 1969.⁴⁷

The new Nixon Administration made the initial steps toward a rapprochement with Communist China. The U.S. strategy was to exploit the obvious Sino-Soviet split. Nixon's first action was to end periodic patrolling by the U.S. Navy of the Taiwan Strait. The U.S.-PRC rapprochement resulted in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. The U.S. acknowledged in the communiqué the Chinese position that there is only China and Taiwan is part of that China. This was significant because before 1972, the U.S. maintained the position that Taiwan was unresolved territory. The Shanghai communiqué was the first step in normalizing relations between the U.S. and Communist China⁴⁸

According to Patrick Tyler in his book, *A Great Wall*, President Jimmy Carter never had a doubt he would be the president to make the final step in normalizing relations with the PRC.⁴⁹ On 15 December 1978, President Carter announced to the world that the PRC and the U.S. would establish diplomatic relations on 1 January 1979. Furthermore, the U.S. would formally end the 1954 U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty on 1 January 1980.⁵⁰ Congress believed the president's plan to be inadequate because it failed to provide for Taiwan's security and it did not address a commitment from the PRC to refrain from using force against Taiwan.⁵¹ As a result, Congress enacted Public Law 96-8: Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Unlike the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, the TRA did not commit the U.S. to the defense of Taiwan, but did authorize the sale of weapons to

Taiwan for its defense, and authorized the president and congress to determine appropriate action if the security of Taiwan is in question.⁵²

In 1996, the president and his senior advisors had to determine appropriate action to a provocative PRC military exercise. The PRC fired missiles into the Taiwan Straits attempting to influence the 1996 Taiwan presidential election. The PRC was hoping that the action would help defeat Taiwanese candidates who were espousing Taiwan independence. President Clinton demonstrated U.S. commitment to Taiwan by ordering two carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait area.⁵³

Although the Clinton Administration demonstrated a commitment to Taiwan in 1996, it desires to build a friendly relationship with Mainland China. In 1998, President Clinton while on a trip to Mainland China, displayed his commitment to a positive U.S.-China relationship by declaring the “three nos,” “No support for Taiwan’s independence, no support for two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan; and no support for Taiwan’s entry into the organizations composed of sovereign states.”⁵⁴

PACOM Implications: By studying the history of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship the planner gains critical information needed to develop TEP, including the Shanghai Communiqué, the Taiwan Relation’s Act, and U.S policy towards the PRC. Moreover, history assists the planner to comprehend why the current relationship between Taiwan and China is tenuous and why the Chinese will view the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act as a provocation. Moreover, history helps the planner understand Martin Lassiter’s argument that China is most likely to use force against Taiwan if Taiwan seeks to become an independent nation-state separate from Chinese territory or Taiwan appears likely to become a base of military operations for a foreign power such as the United States.⁵⁵ In

the end, the planner will comprehend that with the U.S. policies towards Taiwan and China, PACOM should be initially cautious to preclude provoking any Chinese military action; to prevent Taiwan from becoming over confident that the U.S. will come to their assistance and therefore demand independence; and to ensure there is no further strain to the U.S.-China relationship.

TEP Implications: Although the U.S-Taiwan relationship is complex, studying any country's historical relationship with the U.S. provides the planner national policy information that the NSS and JSCP do not provide. History provides the planner developing TEP an understanding of U.S. interests, policies, and obligations towards a given country. The author contends that lacking NSS and JSCP guidance, the study of history helps fill the void. The author argues that history should not replace the NSS and JSCP, but until they become more definitive in nature, the planner must use history to augment the paucity of strategic guidance.

Now that the planner understands how the U.S. views Taiwan and that history provides important information in the conduct of developing TEP, it is now time to discern how the world views Taiwan. The next section analyzes Taiwan's international legal status to determine further planning implications to TEP.

TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS

After the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang government retreated to the island of Taiwan. Immediately thereafter, many countries to include Japan and the U.S. recognized the Republic of China (ROC), also called Taiwan, as the sole legitimate government of China. The ROC became a charter

member of the United Nations and held the seat of one of the five permanent members of the Security Council.⁵⁶

The ROC's position as a member of the Security Council met with considerable resistance from the Soviet Union. In 1950, the Soviet Union and India submitted resolutions that called for the PRC to occupy the China seat in the UN and for the expulsion of the ROC. The UN members soundly defeated the resolutions and for the next two decades, the United States and its allies successfully blocked Beijing's efforts to take Taipei's UN seat.⁵⁷

From 1951 to 1960 the ROC's friends and allies argued that the PRC did not meet the UN Charter's prerequisite that members must be peace-loving states. In 1960, support for Beijing's admission to the UN intensified, compelling the U.S. and other nations to invoke Article 18 of the UN Charter. Invoking Article 18 meant that any resolution dealing with PRC and Chinese representation in the UN required a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly. The ROC and the U.S. had a sufficient amount of allies and friends in the UN to prevent a majority vote, however, as the Cold War tensions eased in the early 1970s, Taiwan's position began to weaken.⁵⁸

By 1971, world opinion to include the U.S. position was changing regarding the PRC's entrance to the UN. In 1971, the U.S. Congress abstained from issuing its traditional statement of opposing the entry of the PRC into the UN. Furthermore, the same year, the Nixon Administration withdrew its opposition to seating the PRC in the UN, however, continued to oppose the expulsion of the ROC.⁵⁹ Despite the U.S. opposition to the ROC's expulsion, in the fall of 1971, the 26th session of the UN adopted Resolution 2758 (XXVI), expelling the ROC and giving the seat to the PRC.⁶⁰

After the ROC's unseating from the UN, dozen of nations broke-off diplomatic relationships and recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China. Because the UN no longer recognized the ROC, international organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund began expelling Taiwan. By the mid 1980s, most important international organizations had expelled Taiwan.⁶¹

Although the UN and other international bodies do not recognize the ROC, Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations with thirty countries, the preponderance being in the developing African countries, Central America and the Caribbean. No country in Asia has formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.⁶² The U.S. has no formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. As discussed in chapter three, the U.S. recognizes the PRC as the legitimate government of China.

PACOM Implications: By analyzing Taiwan's international status, the planner should conclude that multilateral exercises involving Taiwan with other Asian nations are not feasible. This is a result of all Asian nations recognizing Mainland China as the official government of China. Moreover, if China attacked Taiwan, China would declare it an internal matter and reject any call for UN intervention. Therefore, with the possible exception of U.S. assistance, Taiwan must be strong enough to defend itself.⁶³

TEP Implications: Although Taiwan may arguably be the most unique case in the world with respect to its international legal status, there may be other countries in a CINC's region that have unique legal circumstances. The author contends that without examining this area, the planner may fail to recognize potential constraints to TEP and therefore develop inappropriate operational engagement activities.

By studying the U.S.-Taiwan history and Taiwan's international legal status, the planner has discovered potential constraints to planning, for examples, concern over Mainland China reaction and no multilateral exercises. Next, the planner must determine where Taiwan would lie as a priority in the overall regional TEP. This is an important step for the planner, because resources are limited and other countries may have a higher priority.⁶⁴ To determine Taiwan's priority, the planner should explore U.S. alliances in the region and analyze commitments and obligations.

U.S.-ASIA-SECURITY ALLIANCES

The system of permanent alliances is a relatively new phenomenon to the U.S. Before World War II, the U.S. adhered to a no alliance policy. A "no foreign entanglements" policy had been in effect since the adoption of the constitution. The catalyst for departure from the policy was the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949.⁶⁵ The Truman Administration concluded that to go forward with economic reconstruction and ensure political stability in Western Europe would require a framework military alliance framework. It was clear to the U.S. that it would have to provide a security umbrella and pledged to help defend Western Europe against a Soviet attack. In 1949, twelve countries including the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

By joining an alliance, the Truman Administration identified its post World War II security interests and signaled a commitment to intervene militarily if necessary to thwart communist aggression. Before the Korean War, the only areas to merit military intervention were the NATO area, Latin America, and the defense perimeter running from Japan, through the Philippines, to Australia.⁶⁶

The U.S. had announced that it would protect a limited portion of the Pacific perimeter, but had no formal security alliances within Asia. It is arguable that the U.S. omission of the Korean Peninsula as a security interest provided North Korea the impetus to invade South Korea. To guard against further communist aggression in Southeast Asia and the reemergence of a powerful Japan, the U.S. entered into security alliances with the Philippines, Japan, Australia and New Zealand in 1951, the Republic of Korea in 1953 and signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in 1954.⁶⁷

Philippines

As the cold war intensified in 1947-1948, the U.S. extended its containment strategy from Europe into Asia. In 1947, the U.S. and the Philippines signed a Military Bases Agreement (MBA). The MBA provided for the retention of U.S. military bases and for the use of additional facilities in the future.⁶⁸ The two major facilities were Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base

Four years after the MBA, the U.S. entered into its first Asian alliance with the Philippines on 31 August 1951. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty recognized that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the parties would be dangerous and that each would act in accordance with their respective constitutional process. The areas of interest in the Pacific included the metropolitan areas, the island territories under jurisdiction in the Pacific and the armed forces.⁶⁹ The U.S.-Philippine relationship remained strong until 1990 when the two countries reached an impasse over extending the MBA for an additional 10 years.

In 1991, the Philippine Senate voted against ratifying the MBA. On 1 October 1992, the U.S. Navy withdrew the last of its forces from Subic Bay Naval Base. The eruption

of Mount Pinatubo had destroyed Clark Air Base in June 1991 and by November of that year, the U.S. had transferred its control to the Philippine government.⁷⁰ In spite of the unilateral termination of the MBA, U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty remains in effect and the U.S. conducts an annual exercise with the Philippines.

Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS)

On 1 September 1951, the U.S. entered into an alliance with Australia and New Zealand. The ANZUS Pact recognized that an armed attack in the Pacific area against any of the parties would endanger the peace and safety of the others. The treaty committed them to confer in the event of a threat, and in the event of attack to act in accordance with their respective constitutional process. The three nations also promised to develop an individual capacity to resist, as well as a collective capacity to act.⁷¹ The ANZUS Pact did not provide for a formal military structure or standing forces. The tripartite relationship remained strong until 1985 when New Zealand instituted an antinuclear policy.

New Zealand's antinuclear policy banned nuclear-armed vessels from its ports, including those of the U.S. Navy. In response, the U.S. formally suspended its treaty obligation with New Zealand in 1986 and reduced the two countries' military ties.⁷² Even with the rift between the U.S. and New Zealand, Australia considers the ANZUS Pact the cornerstone of its defense strategy.⁷³

Japan

On 8 September 1951, the U.S. entered into a security alliance with Japan. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty provided for Japanese security by agreeing that the two countries take joint action in the event of an armed attack. The treaty also eased regional

concerns by providing for the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, because much of Asia feared the reemergence of a powerful Japan.⁷⁴

The U.S. has forces deployed on Okinawa and Japan. Stationed on Okinawa is a battalion of the 1st Special Forces Group, the 3d Marine Corps Division along with the 1st Marine Corps air wings. The Air Force has two air wings of the 5th Air Force on Japan. The U.S. now considers its alliance with Japan its most important bilateral relationship and both countries agree that the treaty is fundamental to Pacific security policy and global strategic objectives.⁷⁵

Republic of Korea.

On 1 Oct 1953, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty. The treaty stipulates that each country recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the parties would be dangerous and that each would act in accordance with their respective constitutional process. As a precautionary measure, when the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty, they added the provision that the U.S. would not honor the treaty if South Korea was the aggressor. The treaty also authorized the stationing of U.S. air, land and sea forces in South Korea.⁷⁶

Currently the U.S. maintains approximately 37,000 personnel stationed in the Republic of Korea. The 2d Infantry Division and the 7th Air Force comprise the preponderance of the forces. The U.S. and the Republic of Korea engage in annual joint exercises “Foal Eagle” and “Ulchi Focus Lens.”

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty

In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called for an alliance to prevent communist countries from gaining control of Indochina.⁷⁷ On 8 September 1954,

representatives of eight countries signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), commonly referred to as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The countries included: Australia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Although Indochina countries did not sign the treaty, the treaty accorded them military protection.⁷⁸

The treaty defined its purpose as defensive only and included provisions for mutual aid to prevent and counter subversive activities. SEATO had no standing forces, but relied on its member states to provide forces when necessary. Animosity rose between the member nations because of a perceived dominance in SEATO by the western nations, specifically the U.S. In 1968, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO and in 1976, France suspended financial support. The SEATO formally ended on 30 June 1977.⁷⁹ Despite the dissolution of SEATO, the Manila Pact remains viable and is the basis of U.S. security commitments to Thailand. As part of PACOM's TEP, the U.S. and Thailand engage in the annual joint exercise Cobra Gold.

PACOM Implications: By exploring U.S. alliances in Asia, the planner should conclude the U.S. has several legal security commitments in the PACOM theater. Therefore, he should recognize that because Taiwan is not an official ally of the U.S., it would arguably not be the first priority. There are limited resources for TEP, and Japan, Korea, Australia and perhaps Thailand would assuredly have a higher priority than Taiwan.

TEP Implications: Regardless of the country evaluated, the planner must thoroughly grasp all the U.S. commitments and obligations in a CINC's respective region to

determine priorities. Once analyzed, the planner should have a fundamental idea of a country's priority and resources available for planning operational engagement activities.

Now that the author has evaluated three areas he perceives as necessary additions to *CJCSM 3113.01A*, the next chapter focuses on four areas that *CJCSM 3113.0A* directs that the planner must evaluate: external threats, along with the military, economic and political and condition of the country. The chapter analyzes their relevance and determines whether they provide sufficient information to develop TEP.

CHAPTER THREE

CJCSM 3113.01A directs that the planner conduct an evaluation of the country's external threat, along with the military, economic and political condition of the country. This chapter analyzes whether the criteria provide the planner with sufficient information to beginning framing TEP and if sufficient information is available to actually conduct the evaluation.

TAIWAN'S EXTERNAL SECURITY THREAT

*If a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will have no choice but to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and achieve the great cause of reunification.*⁸⁰

China's National Defense White Paper 2000

Taiwan's National Defense Report 2000 states, "the possible PRC use of force against Taiwan is the most serious threat to the ROC's existence."⁸¹ Taiwan bases its views on China's rhetoric. In China's White Paper on the "One China Principle and Taiwan

Issue,’’ Beijing stated that the settlement of Taiwan is an internal matter and although a peaceful reunification is preferable, China will not renounce the use of force.⁸² Taiwan fears that China will employ its army, navy and air force in combination with an overwhelming missile attack to force reunification.⁸³

China alleges that it will use force to compel Taiwan into reunification, however, is China’s military capable of enforcing its rhetoric? Most China experts agree that China’s current military strength is insufficient to reunite Taiwan by force.⁸⁴

However, China is transforming its military with a combination of qualitative change in personnel, training and equipment. China intends to vastly improve its People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).⁸⁵

China has a standing military of 2.5 million of which 1.8 million are in the PLA. The PLA’s ground forces are comprised of approximately seventy-five maneuver divisions. However, in 1999, Prime Minister Jiang Zemin announced that PLA would reduce its size over the next three years by 500,000. The intent is to transform the PLA to fight local wars under high tech conditions by focusing on quality, not quantity.⁸⁶ The PLA’s focus is not only on personnel improvements, but also on the upgrade of its equipment.

The PLA is working to improve the accuracy and range of its land-based missiles. By 2005, the PLA expects to deploy two types of short-range ballistic missiles and a first generation land-attack cruise missile. The missiles would have the ability to accurately target critical facilities, such as airfields, C4I nodes and key logistics centers on Taiwan.⁸⁷ These missiles will be in addition to the already 400 short, medium and long-range missiles capable of reaching Taiwan. Department of Defense analysts believe that by

2005 the Chinese will have approximately 650 missiles capable of targeting Taiwan.⁸⁸ Taiwan now considers a missile attack to be the most seriously threat from China.⁸⁹ In fact, the DOD concluded in a report that despite anticipated improvements in Taiwan's missile and air defense systems the PLA will have the capability to attack the ROC with air and missile strikes by 2005, which would degrade key military facilities and damage the island's economic infrastructure.⁹⁰ In addition to developing its missile force, the Army continues to work on its power projection capability by adding more rapid reactions divisions.

Much attention in the West has focused on the recent reorganization of the Chinese Army. The PLA has organized 12 "rapid reaction" divisions that can mobilize quickly to respond to external as well as internal threats. However, China has yet to build enough air transportation to make the army a large external intervention force. The PLAAF now has the capability to drop two airborne brigades, approximately 6000 soldiers, possibly enough to control major ports and wait for reinforcements.⁹¹ China has endeavored to make vast improvements in the quality of the PLA and if trends continue the PLA of the future will be a formidable force, however, they currently have no way to project that force onto Taiwan other than missiles and a limited quantity of airborne forces.

China's ability to conduct an amphibious assault on Taiwan using ground forces is virtually impossible because of the lack of amphibious assault ships. Currently China only has forty-nine troop carrying ships with three more under construction; enough to carry one mechanized division across the strait. It would take approximately 600 landing craft nearly two weeks to transport twenty divisions to Taiwan. Moreover, there is no

sign that China plans to build more ships in the future.⁹² However, China is investing in other facets of the PLAN. The Chinese have increased the number of ships and overall tonnage and is planning to continue the increase for the next five years. The most recent additions are two Russian built “*Sovremenny*” class destroyers. Delivered in February 2000, they are the most powerful warships ever operated by the Chinese Navy. To complement its surface ships the PLAN is also improving its submarine fleet.

China has recently decided to upgrade its submarine fleet and plans to have a more lethal, smaller fleet. China’s strategy to achieve this goal is by procuring foreign made submarines and producing its own high quality submarine. The Chinese purchased four Kilo class submarines from Russia and may purchase more in the future.⁹³ Jane’s Fighting Ships claims that if Russia provided China its newest torpedoes, it will be a major step forward in China’s submarine capabilities. In 1999, China commissioned the first Song class submarine. The Song may be fitted with an anti ship missile capable of submerged launch. In addition to building two more Song class submarines, the PLAN will commission its newest nuclear powered submarine into service in 2004.⁹⁴ The DOD analysts believe PRC submarines will enable the PLAN to control the sea-lanes and mine approaches around Taiwan. Taiwan’s concern is that if China’s maritime posture continues improving, the PLAN could attempt to blockade Taiwan and try to force reunification. In addition to concern over a potential blockade, Taiwan is also concerned about China’s acquisition and development of aerospace capabilities.

China is now developing and procuring aircraft and airborne systems with capabilities relevant to military operations with Taiwan. Analysts expect operational deployment of China’s most advanced aircraft between 2005-2010. These aircraft have advanced air-to

air missiles, which counter the increasingly sophisticated Taiwanese Air Force. In spite of China's commitment to develop a local aerospace industry capable of producing technologically advanced aircraft, it has had to attempt building a superior air force based largely on Russian and Israel equipment. Acquisitions from Russia have included 50 SU-27 jet fighters and the production rights for 200 more, 72 Su-30 fighter-bombers with negotiations on licensed production rights for 200 more. The PLA is developing its own J-10 jet fighter scheduled for service in 2005, however much of the avionics equipment comes from Israel.⁹⁵ A DOD report contends that after 2005, if projected trends continue, the balance of air power across the Taiwan Strait could begin to shift in China's favor.⁹⁶

PACOM Implications: According to the experts studied (see footnote 84), China is not currently capable of attempting any aggressive action to reunite Taiwan by force. Therefore, PACOM does not have to take abrupt action concerning Taiwan's defense. However, most China experts studied believe that somewhere after 2005 and before 2015 (see footnote 84), China may have a qualitatively better military force than Taiwan. Therefore, the planner must concern himself with the future and how best to assist Taiwan against China's apparent quest to become a military power. Once the planner determines the external threat, there is sufficient information to explore the threat using libraries, the internet and DOD information.

TEP Implications: One of the TEP imperatives is to help enhance a country's deterrence capability. Examining the external threat is essential because it provides the planner fundamental information against whom or where he should focus his operational

engagement activities. The author argues that an external threat evaluation is the first step for the planner to develop a framework for TEP.

Now that the planner has evaluated the external threat, he must now evaluate the host nation's military to determine strengths and weaknesses. By examining the military's strengths and weaknesses, the planner can compare them to the external threat and begin to discern what type of operational engagement activities to recommend.

TAIWAN'S MILITARY CONDITION

Our primary task is the establishment of a preventive, speedy response military capability, to let Mainland China know of the terrible sacrifice that an invasion of Taiwan could entail, so that they might not take actions.⁹⁷

Lee Teng-hui, President.

After the termination of marital law in 1987, the ROC officially recognized the PRC as the legal government of Mainland China and abandoned the ambition of reunifying China by force. Taiwan's military strategy has since shifted from a focus of attacking the mainland to a defensive and deterrence strategy. The shift from an offensive to a defensive and deterrence strategy called for balancing the development of its three armed forces: the army, navy and air force with the navy and air force having first priority. The long-term strategy is to transform the military into an elite fighting force that is self sufficient in defense technology. This calls for reducing the total number of men in uniform, the restructuring of the armed forces, streamlining command levels and renovating logistics systems.⁹⁸

In 1997, Taiwan implemented the *Jing Shi* Program (Solid Yet Elite) to streamline the command (higher levels) and consolidate the field (lower levels) of the military structure. The Program's design was to reduce manpower by stressing firepower and mobility and to create a military force that is elite, smaller, and more lethal. When the Program reaches its completion in June 2001, Taiwan's military manpower will reduce from 453,000 to 400,000 with the preponderance of cuts in the army, which will number about 200,000. There is also an ongoing reduction in general officers from 700 to around 400.⁹⁹ Although all three military services have undergone changes, the biggest structural changes are in the army.

In 1997, Taiwan revised its strategy for the army after it determined that China was incapable of invading using an amphibious assault. The original plan emphasized that ground forces oppose hostile amphibious forces on the beach and launch counterattacks. The revised plan places more emphasis on ground forces countering Chinese attacks on major ports and installations using combined operations.¹⁰⁰

To enable the army to counter PLA attacks, the army is replacing division level units with combined arms brigades (CAB) that have adequate manpower, better mobility, and ample firepower. The plan is to have twelve striking brigades by 2001 with a total of thirty a few years later. The eighteen second-line defense brigades will be responsible for providing training to new conscripts and educating the reserves during peacetime. To fully implement the CABs, the ROC army is in the process of modernizing its equipment.¹⁰¹

The preponderance of the modernization results from purchases from the U.S. In June 1996, the U.S. agreed to sell Taiwan 300 M60A3 tanks equipped with thermal sights

and 105mm gun. A year later, the U.S. announced it would transfer an additional 180 M60A3 tanks to Taiwan. Analysts expect the army to have approximately 1700 tanks by 2005. Taiwan and the U.S. have discussed the purchase of the surplus M1 Abrams tanks; however, have not reached a deal. Taiwan has also purchased from the U.S. M109 self-propelled howitzers along with forty-two AH1 Cobra attack and twenty-six OH-58D Kiowa scout helicopters. Taiwan has also purchased three batteries of the Patriot PAC 2 to help prevent a missile attack. Analysts expect Taiwan to purchase three additional batteries of the Patriot PAC 3 before 2005. To train with this equipment, Taiwan established a new training center similar to the U.S. military's combined training centers. The new center will train at the battalion level.¹⁰² Although the army has undergone the structural changes, Taiwan's air force is also in the process of change.

Jane's Sentinel calls the Taiwan' Air force (TAF) one of the country's strongest military assets. During peacetime, the air force's mission is to protect the security of Taiwan's air space as well as the integrity and sovereignty of Taiwan areas. Because of the PLAAF's numerical superiority in aircraft, the Taiwan Air Force (TAF) has focused on upgrading its air fleet in order conduct its assigned wartime mission.¹⁰³

The TAF has approximately 520 combat aircraft. Of these, approximately 210 are state of the art aircraft. In the 1990s, Taiwan purchased 150 F-16s from the U.S. and 60 Mirage 2000-5s from France. Taiwan also purchased advanced art air-to air missiles with the aircraft. The F-16 and the Mirage 2000-5 are superior to any of the PLAAF's aircraft to include the SU 27's purchased from Russia. Additionally, the training program for pilots is superior to the PLAAF's and the TAF's pilots enjoy a 2:1 advantage in training hours. Moreover, the PLAAF pilots receive very little training flying over the water for

fear they may defect. The remaining inventory includes approximately 180 of the older F-5E/F fighters and 130 of the Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF). Analysts believe the IDF to be superior to any PLAAF fighters built in China. The TAF plans to use the IDF for low altitude interception and ground attack, the F-16 for mid altitude interception and ground attack and the Mirage 2000-5 for high altitude interception.¹⁰⁴ Taiwan has made the development of its air force priority, however not at the expense of developing a capable navy to counter any Mainland China blockade.

In the mid and late 1990s, Taiwan began purchasing foreign ships and producing their own capabilities. The navy has taken delivery of six Lafayette-class frigates from France equipped with the Phalanx air-defense systems, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine warfare helicopter. Furthermore, the navy leased nine Knox-class frigates from the U.S. with the options to lease additional ships. The frigates possess the MK 15 Phalanx 20-millimeter guns and the AN/SWG-1A Harpoon anti-ship missiles launches. The sonar on the frigate also provides the ROC Navy with its most effective anti-submarine capability.¹⁰⁵ One of the most profound problems for ROC Navy is the lack of submarines. The navy only possesses four World War II era submarines, while the PLAN has approximately seventy submarines. The U.S. refuses to sell Taiwan any additional submarines because it fears Taiwan may use them as an offensive capability to attack Mainland China. Finally, the ROC Navy purchased S 70 anti-submarine helicopters from the U.S., however, they are incapable of tracking the PLAN's Kilo-class submarines purchased from Russia.¹⁰⁶ In addition to purchasing naval assets the ROC Navy is also in the process of building its own indigenous naval force aimed at keeping

the sea lanes surrounding Taiwan, enhancing counter-blockade capabilities and in general, neutralizing the PLAN's efforts to control the sea.

Taiwan is embarking on an aggressive program to develop indigenous naval capability. In the 1990s, Taiwan produced seven Perry-class frigates with the help of technology from the U.S. These frigates primary function will be anti-submarine warfare. Furthermore, Taiwan has begun producing coastal patrol boats to build up their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. Taiwan's greatest challenge is the building of four Aegis-class guided missile destroyers. Once built, the ships will be able to identify and intercept PLAAF aircraft early before they reach the island.¹⁰⁷ The navy and the other two services provide Taiwan a formidable force, however, the military is not without significant problems.¹⁰⁸

The *Jing Shi* Program of 1997 failed to address the need for joint operations, therefore, Taiwan's is not as prepared as it should be to fend off a potential Mainland China attack. The problem with joint operations revealed itself in recent exercises by displaying troubles with military coordination and equipment interoperability. Even if Taiwan's joint capability improves, it will still be weak in missile defense.¹⁰⁹ Taiwan has purchased U.S. air defense systems and is working to improve its organic missile defense systems, but that is still insufficient to stop an incoming missile salvo from China.¹¹⁰ The military has also been plagued by procurement scandals and training accidents.

Taiwan's military has suffered a series of procurement scandals in the past few years. In fact, in the past few months, Taiwan officials jailed thirteen military officers, detained two retired generals, and held for questioning ten other high-ranking officers – including a former naval commander-in-chief.¹¹¹ The military is also experiencing a spate of safety

problems. Since 1995, twenty-two officers have died in the line of duty. Contributing to the safety problems is the military's inability to understand the complexities of the modern equipment. The cases of corruption and safety problems have the potential to undermine public support for the defense budget, with serious implication for Taiwan's security.¹¹²

PACOM Implications: Taiwan is attempting to modernize its military to deter an attack from Mainland China, and if necessary defend the country. Taiwan realizes that with Mainland China's numerical superiority in equipment and personnel, the defense of Taiwan requires a qualitative advantage in equipment training and personnel. Unfortunately, modernization has brought associated problems, i.e., corruption and accidents. PACOM needs to focus on the identified weaknesses while helping Taiwan maintain its qualitative edge in training.¹¹³ Information relating to Taiwan's military is unlimited. The author recommends using *Jane's* military journals as the primary source of information

TEP Implications: Studying a country's military provides the planner important information. A planner develops TEP to help build or maintain country's deterrence capability; however, without identifying military strengths and weaknesses, the planner would have no basis for framing operational engagement activities to assist the country.

After evaluation Taiwan's external threat and its military, the planner probably now has a fundamental idea of what he wants to accomplish. However, before developing operational engagement activities for Taiwan, he must first determine what Taiwan can afford, because the host nation is responsible to pay an appropriate portion of the cost.¹¹⁴

TAIWAN'S ECONOMIC CONDITION

Since 1949, Taiwan 's economy has grown from one based predominately on agricultural to one of the major economic powers in the Asian Pacific Region and world. In 1998, Taiwan's free market economy ranked first or second in the world in terms of foreign currency reserves and ranked seventh as a source of foreign investment. Moreover, Taiwan is the world's thirteenth largest trading nation, ranked twentieth in gross national product and twenty-fifth in per capita income. In 1997, Taiwan's vibrant economy precluded the country from feeling the adverse affect of the Asian finance crisis that devastated many of the other Asian nations.¹¹⁵ Although Taiwan's economy is one of the world's strongest, it has recently suffered a forty-two percent decline in its stock market. Analysts believe a stagnating U.S. stock market, high-energy prices, and doubts about the Asian economies are some of the reasons behind the country's stock market plunge. To slow the stock market plunge, President Chen Shui-bian has unveiled a new economic policy designed to revive the economy.¹¹⁶

PACOM Implications: Taiwan has developed one of the most influential economies in the world ranking high in most of the major economic indicators. It prospered during the Asian financial crisis while other countries in Asia foundered. Although suffering a stock market plunge in the past few months, the government is working to revive the economy. Based on Taiwan's historical economic performance, the planner should assume that Taiwan's economy will revive itself and Taiwan would be able to afford the operational activities developed for TEP. Information pertaining to Taiwan's economy is readily available; the monograph's author used the internet and Jane's Sentinel to acquire information.

TEP Implications: The author agrees that evaluating the economy is relevant to TEP. By understanding a country's economic situation, it allows the planner to begin determining appropriate cost sharing if necessary. TEP is not free, however, if a country is suffering from economic difficulties, the respective CINC may share the cost associated with the TEP.

The final area of analysis is a country's political condition. The planner must determine if there is political instability that could affect Taiwan's security.¹¹⁷

TAIWAN'S POLITICAL CONDITION

Since 1949, Taiwan has evolved from an autocratic system under martial law to a liberal democracy. Taiwan rescinded martial law in 1987 and the first democratic elections took place in 1996. The 1996 elections completed the transition to an open democratic system in which the authorities generally respect human rights.¹¹⁸ Taiwan's evolution to democracy defies conventional wisdom because it evolved without bloodshed, unlike most transitions from autocracy to democracy. Taiwan's democratic government has two major parties responsible for governing the country.¹¹⁹

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a center left party that appears to favor independence and self-determination for Taiwan, formed in 1986 as democracy began to evolve. Taiwan elected DPP member President Chen Shui-bian, who ran on a platform of independence and self-determination in March 2000. Since the election, Chen has toned down his rhetoric to avoid evoking a military response from Mainland China. Although Chen is the president, the DPP remains the second largest party behind the Nationalist Party of China (KMT) in Taiwan's legislature.¹²⁰

The KMT, an anti communist group that established the Republic of China 1949 has the largest presence in Taiwan's legislature. The KMT is also vehemently opposed to independence. The KMT's greatest fear is that Chen's rhetoric may cause Mainland China to take aggressive action against Taiwan. Although there is the normal contention between the two parties there is no risk of insurgency or coup to cause instability.¹²¹

PACOM Implications: Taiwan evolved from an autocracy to democracy without the normal process of civilian agitation and government violence. It has a thriving, stable democracy with no reason to expect any digression in the future. PACOM does not have to concern itself with political instability in Taiwan, therefore, can focus its efforts on Taiwan's primary threat to its existence: China. Like the previous three criteria, there is sufficient information available to study a country's political condition.

TEP Implications: Studying the political situation is relevant to the planner. If there are internal threats contributing to the host nation government's instability, for examples, insurgency, or a potential military coup, the planner should focus the operational engagement activities on those areas. This may involve training the military in counterinsurgency techniques or to work on its professionalism and its subordination to civil government.

Now that the author has explored information requirements versus information availability, the final the final chapter provides conclusions and answers the monograph question: Is sufficient information available to develop TEP?

CHAPTER FOUR

In this chapter, the author analyzes three criteria to answer the monograph question: Is there sufficient information to develop TEP? The author uses the following criteria to

determine sufficiency of information: sufficiency of national policy, sufficiency of doctrine, and sufficiency of information on individual countries and regions. The analysis identifies implications for developing TEP and for the PACOM staff charged with developing TEP for Taiwan.

National Policy Information:

PACOM Implications: The author explored the NSS and any information provided by the Department of State and Department of Defense to derive U.S. strategic policy concerning Taiwan. The NSS provided one strategic goal with respect to Taiwan: adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act while the Department of State and the Defense Department provided no information. As stated previously, the NSS failed to address the significance of the Taiwan Relations Act. As identified in chapter three, constraints associated with the Taiwan Relations Act would arguably limit operational engagement activities in Taiwan.¹²² Moreover, the 1999 NSS fails to address the “One China” policy, although U.S. policy towards China and Taiwan has not changed.¹²³ Concerning Taiwan, national policy documents are extremely vague and the author asserts incomplete. The only option for the PACOM planner is to study the history of U.S.-Taiwan relationship to thoroughly grasp the significance of the U.S. policy towards Taiwan.

TEP Implications: The intent of the NSS and the JSCP are to provide the planner with strategic guidance to develop operational engagement activities, however, the author supports LTC Steinke’s and COL Tarbet’s assertion in chapter one that neither the NSS nor the JSCP provide sufficient strategic guidance for developing TEP. The monograph’s author equates national policy to the commander’s intent in an operation’s order.¹²⁴ If the commander fails to properly define key tasks and a clear end state,

subordinate units will assuredly design inappropriate plans. The author argues that until the NSS and JSCP become more definitive concerning strategic guidance, developing appropriate operational engagement activities would be virtually impossible.

Doctrinal Information.

PACOM/TEP Implications : Doctrinal implications for both PACOM and TEP are similar. Doctrine provides the link between operational planning and strategic objectives for TEP. However, the planner charged with recommending operational engagement activities that support strategic objectives has only three joint doctrinal manuals at his disposal: *Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, May 2000; *Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, June 1996; and *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01A: Theater Engagement Planning*, May 2000.¹²⁵ As discussed in chapter one, only *CJCSM 3113.01A* provides any useful information to the planner.

The problem with the manual is that it fails to does not address two critical issues need to develop TEP. First, the manual does not provide the planner with techniques to evaluate the country, therefore, the planner may have to resort to service versus joint doctrine: *FM 101-5: Staff Planning and Operations*¹²⁶ Second, the manual does not provide the planner JTTP to determine which operational engagement activities are most effective. JTTP would provide methods to develop operational activities by providing standard and detailed courses of actions. Because planners design TEP to enhance a country's deterrence capability, the JTTP could provide methods to assist the planner in developing deterrence capabilities. Lacking JTTP, the planner may resort to theory to

understand what deterrence can accomplish and how to effectively enhance a country's deterrence capability.

Doctrine guides military forces in support of national objectives. The author argues that there is insufficient doctrinal information to develop TEP. The author believes this is a result of the ongoing evolution of TEP. In chapter one, the monograph discusses that TEP is evolving, both in the sense of a planning process and product, and the TEP policy and guidance may change. Currently, the "Joint Staff J-5 has established TEP Policy Working Group to vet and arbitrate both in-cycle and out-of cycle policy change requests."¹²⁷ Lacking joint doctrine, the planner may resort in the interim to alternative sources such as *FM 101-5* and theory, or depend on his analytical abilities to develop TEP.

Country and Regional Information:

PACOM Implications: The monograph examined seven areas that would provide a planner country and regional information with respect to Taiwan. *CJCSM 3113.01A* directs that the planner examine a country's external threat, in addition to its military, economic and political condition. However, the author determined that the information is insufficient and recommended three additional areas for examination. Because the NSS and JSCP fail to address adequately national policy concerning Taiwan, the PACOM staff should study of history to better understand U.S. policies, interests and obligations toward Taiwan.¹²⁸ Moreover, the planner must comprehend how the world views Taiwan by studying its international legal status. Taiwan's lack of diplomatic recognition by U.S. allies and friends would inevitably limit operational engagement activities with the country.¹²⁹ Finally, the planner must study the region as a whole to determine Taiwan's

priority in a resources constrained environment. After studying the region, the planner would undoubtedly determine that Taiwan would not be the first priority for resources. The author contends that without studying the three additional areas, the PACOM planner would have insufficient information to develop TEP for Taiwan.

A PACOM planner has unlimited resources at his disposal to locate information on Taiwan and PACOM's region. The author recommends the internet as the primary tool. It contains the most current information on the country and the region overall.

TEP Implications: The author argues that by studying the four areas directed in *CJCSM 3113.01A*: a country's external threat, along with its military, economic and political condition, does not provide the planner with sufficient information to develop TEP.¹³⁰ The author contends that the NSS and JSCP fail to appropriately address national strategic policy with respect to U.S. allies and friends, therefore, the planner must resort to history to enhance his knowledge of U.S. policies, interests and obligations towards respective countries.

Moreover, the planner should examine a country's international legal status to determine potential TEP constraints. Taiwan may arguably be the most unique case in the world with respect to its international legal status, but there may be other countries in a CINC's region that also have unique legal circumstances. Finally, regardless of the country evaluated, the planner must thoroughly grasp all the U.S. commitments and obligations in a CINC's respective region to determine priorities. As discussed in chapter three, diminishing resources compel the planner to establish priorities. Once analyzed, the planner should have a fundamental idea of a country's priority and resources available for planning operational engagement activities with the respective country.

The information available to examine a respective country is unlimited. Information available from the library, DOD and the internet provide the planner with a plethora of information on countries and regions.

After evaluating the three criteria, the author concludes that there is insufficient information for developing TEP and for the PACOM staff charged with drafting Taiwan's TEP. National policy is vague and ill-defined and doctrine almost non-existent, as a result, the planner should turn to the study of history to help with guidance. What doctrine is available to the planner is grossly insufficient and fails to address critical issues such as methods for evaluation and JTTP; therefore, compels a planner to use alternative sources such as *FM-101-5* and the study of theory. Finally, *CJCSM 3113.01A* does not address all the country and regional information required for developing TEP. The author argues that until the issues addressed in the monograph are resolved, planners charged with developing TEP will not have sufficient information.

ENDNOTES

¹ Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Command and General Staff College, *Peacetime Military Engagement (PME)/Theater Engagement Planning*, available from, <http://www.cgsc.army.mil/djco/jug/tep.htm> Internet; accessed 20 October 2000.

² The sources studied use the acronym TEP interchangeably as theater engagement plans, theater engagement plan, or theater engagement planning.

³ Thomas M. Jordan, Douglas C. Lovelace Jr. and Thomas-Durrell Young, *Shaping the World Through Engagement: Assessing the Department of Defense's Theater Engagement Planning Process* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2000), 2.

⁴ Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Command and General Staff College, *Peacetime Military Engagement (PME)/Theater Engagement Planning*, available from, <http://www.-cgsc.army.mil/djco/jug/tep.htm> Internet; accessed 20 October 2000

⁵ U.S. Army, *Field Manual 100-5: Operations* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), Glossary-3.

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Manual 3113.01A: Theater Engagement Planning*, 31 May 2000, 2.

⁷ Taiwan Enhancement Act Good for the Region, *Liberty Times*, 2 February 2000. The Senate vote will likely be in 2001. Mr. Geoff Babb, instructor and China expert at the U.S. Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and Mr. Stuart D. Lyon, instructor of theater engagement planning at CGSC, confirmed to the author that Taiwan is not part of PACOM's TEP.

⁸ Ralph R. Steinke and Brian L. Tarbet, *Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Tool or a waste of Time*, available from, <http://calisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00spring/steinke.htm> Internet; accessed 31 Oct 00.

⁹ *A National Security Strategy for the New Century* (The White House, December 1999), 36. This policy has changed since the 1998 version. The 1998 NSS also stated that the U.S. would adhere to the "One China" policy, meaning that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of that China. The monograph discusses the significance of the policy and the Taiwan Relations Act in chapter three. The monograph cannot discuss guidance on Taiwan in the JSCP, because it is a classified document. The School of Advanced Military Studies does not allow classified information in the monograph. The author also explored the State Department's and DOD's homepage to gather any national policy relating to Taiwan, however, there was none.

¹⁰ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 5-0: Operations*, II-10.

¹¹ Ralph R. Steinke and Brian L. Tarbet, *Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Tool or a waste of Time*, available from, <http://calisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00spring/steinke.htm>. Internet; accessed 31 October 2000. The White House did not distribute the 1999 NSS until after they had written the article. However, the monograph's author reviewed both versions and saw very little change. Moreover, after reviewing the 1999 NSS and a JSCP, the monograph's author supports Steinke's and Tarbet's assertion that the documents lack focus and are vague in discussing objectives.

¹² Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Command and General Staff College, *Peacetime Military Engagement (PME)/Theater Engagement Planning*, available from, <http://www.-cgsc.army.mil/djco/jug/tep.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 October 2000. The author confirmed the availability of doctrine using the CGSC Department of Joint and Multinational Operations (DJMO) homepage. The DJMO homepage provides information on theater engagement planning and lists available doctrine. The author also checked joint publication series 3.0: Operations and 5.0: Planning.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3.017: Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, 1996. TEP absolutely requires similar joint doctrine. *FM 101-5-1* asserts that tactic, techniques and procedures provide methods to perform assigned missions and functions and the standard and detailed courses of actions that describe how to perform a task. In the monograph author's opinion, DOD must resolve this deficiency soon.

¹⁴ Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Command and General Staff College, *Peacetime Military Engagement (PME)/Theater Engagement Planning*, available from, <http://www.-cgsc.army.mil/djco/jug/tep.htm>. Internet; accessed 20 October 2000.

¹⁵ Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, Command and General Staff College, *Fundamentals of Warfighting, Selected Readings Book Vol. II, Theater Engagement* (Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1999), 1. This is student manual used by the author during CGSC AY 99-00.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, May 2000. This joint publication only provides a paragraph on what type of operational engagement activities the CINC can use to accomplish strategic objectives.

¹⁷ Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, Command and General Staff College, *Fundamentals in Warfighting, Selected Readings Book Vol. II, Theater Engagement* (Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1999), 5.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A: Theater Engagement Planning*, 31 May 2000, A-1-C-14.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ U.S. Army, *Field Manual 101-5: Staff Organizations and Planning* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 5-5.

²² Already discussed in footnote 13, but the author is reemphasizing the issues, because the deficiency is so profound.

²³ The monograph discusses TEP as deterrence on page 6.

²⁴ *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Department of Defense, 1997), 7.

²⁵ Keith Krause, "Rationality and Deterrence in Theory and Practice" in *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, ed. Craig A. Snyder (New York: Routledge, 1999), 121. The deterrence theorists studied all have similar definitions.

²⁶ Flexible response is the current U.S. deterrence doctrine. The U.S. National Military Strategy states the keys to deterrence are credible standing nuclear and conventional forces to cause potential adversaries to consider the consequences of pursuing aggression; that is flexible response.

²⁷ Statesmen believe that England and France's acquiescence to Hitler's demands for annexing part of Czechoslovakia led to World War II.

²⁸ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 191.

²⁹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 92.

³⁰ Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 19. Many of the authors studied refer to George and Smoke's book on deterrence

³¹ Ibid.

³² Deterrence theorists Alexander L George, Richard Smoke, Keith Krause, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), use the term denial and punishment.

³³ George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, 27.

³⁴ A.J. Bachevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington DC: National University Press, 1986), 13.

³⁵ Krause, "Rationality and Deterrence in Theory and Practice," in *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, 123.

³⁶ Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 273. Brodie was the first scholar to analyze the real strategic and political significance of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of World War II.

³⁷ Krause, "Rationality and Deterrence in Theory and Practice," in *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, 124.

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- ³⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁹ Craig A. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*, 15.
- ⁴⁰ *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 14.
- ⁴¹ The monograph discusses the issue of the U.S. support to Taiwan in chapter three.
- ⁴² Dennis Van Vranken Hickey. *Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 46.
- ⁴³ The issue of resources is serious. As the U.S. military reduced in size in the past decade, but has increased commitments, personnel shortages have become a problem. Moreover, the 2000 DOD budget is about 2.4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), the lowest since the interwar years. Both of these points factored together forces the planner to intimately understand where a country is the priority and what assets are available. The planner becomes informed by understanding all U.S. commitments and obligations in the region and can then plan appropriately.
- ⁴⁴ Ralph N. Clough, *Island China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). 8.
- ⁴⁵ Hungdah Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in *China and the Taiwan Issue*, ed. Hungdah Chu (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 160.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ⁴⁷ Martin L. Lassiter, *U.S. Interest in the New Taiwan* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1994), 10.
- ⁴⁸ Martin L. Lassiter, *U.S. Interest in the New Taiwan*, 12.
- ⁴⁹ Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 230.
- ⁵⁰ Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in *China and the Taiwan Issue*, 184.
- ⁵¹ Martin L. Lassiter, *The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 160.
- ⁵² Lester L. Wolff and David L Simon, *Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act* (New York: American Association for Chinese Studies, 1982), 288-289.
- ⁵³ Martin L. Lassiter, *Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: The American Response*, available from, <http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/IS-lassiter-0200.htm>. Internet; accessed 15 September 2000.
- ⁵⁴ June Teufel Dreyer, "Taiwan's Military: A View from Afar," in *The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century*, ed. Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 311.

⁵⁵ Martin L. Lassiter, *Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: The American Response*, available from, <http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/IS-Lassiter-2000.htm>. Internet; accessed 20 September 2000.

⁵⁶ Clough, *Island China*, 149.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 150-151.

⁵⁸ Van Vranken Hickey, *Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System*, 113-114.

⁵⁹ Clough, *Island China*, 152.

⁶⁰ Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in *China and the Taiwan Issue*, 155.

⁶¹ Van Vranken Hickey, *Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System*, 114.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ China has requested Taiwan's request for membership in the UN for eight consecutive years. The Taiwan Relations Act only states that the president and congress have the option to take action if Mainland China attacked Taiwan. The policy has produced many discussions and articles in the academic community on whether the U.S. would or should intervene.

⁶⁴ The monograph discusses the issue concerning resources in footnote 43.

⁶⁵ Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 4.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁶⁷ Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in *China and the Taiwan Issue*, 160.

⁶⁸ *Fact Sheet: U.S., Asia-Pacific Security Alliances*, available from, <http://www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/journals/foreign/january98/prl8fact.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000.

⁶⁹ William E. Berry, *Threat Perceptions in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore*, available from, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocpl6.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000. One of the more contentious issues between the Philippines and the U.S. is the Spratly Islands. The Philippines and five other nations claim rights to some of the Islands, while China claims rights to all of the islands. Possession of the islands would also give the countries control of the surrounding waters, which are believed to have large deposits of oil. In the past few years, the Philippines and China have had minor skirmishes concerning the islands, but the U.S. refuses to acknowledge that the islands are included in the security agreement and has stated that the Spratly issue should be resolved among the nations involved peacefully.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Joseph Camilleri, *The Australian-New Zealand-U.S. Alliance: Regional Security in the Nuclear Age* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 7.

⁷² W. David McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1954-55* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 405.

⁷³ ANZUS Still Key Part of Strategy, available from, <http://www.mercury.illnews.com.au/wed/2061330.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000. Australia's Prime Minister John Howard made the statement about the ANZUS pact.

⁷⁴ Michel J. Green, "Interests, Asymmetries, and Strategic Choices," in *The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 8.

⁷⁵ Ralph A. Cossa, "U.S.-Japan Security Relations: Separating Fact from Fiction," in *Restructuring the U.S. Japan Alliance*, ed. Ralph A. Cossa (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic Studies, 1997), 33.

⁷⁶ William E Berry Jr. *The Invitation to Struggle: Executive Legislative Competition over the U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 17 May 1997), 2. North Korea is one of the last communist countries remaining after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. As a result, the country has suffered political isolation, much of it self-imposed, and has until recently refused to discuss peace with rival South Korea. However, on 31 October 2000, North Korea took a step towards peace by joining South Korea as co-sponsors in their first ever joint resolution to encourage peace efforts on the Korean Peninsula.

⁷⁷ Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, available from, <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/6163/seato.html>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000.

⁷⁸ Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, available from, <http://www.bartleby.com/65/st/SthEATO.html>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000.

⁷⁹ Fact Sheet: U.S., Asia-Pacific Security Alliances, available from, <http://www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/journals/foreign/january98/prl8fact.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000.

⁸⁰ PRC Defense White Paper, available from, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html>. Internet; accessed 21 October 2000. The PRC released the White Paper in October 2000.

⁸¹ 2000 National Defense Report Republic of China, (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, August 2000), 55.

⁸² Ibid., 70.

⁸³ Ibid., 56.

⁸⁴ The author studied June Teufel Dreyer, Martine Lassiter, David Shambaugh, Frank Morore, Michael Pillsbury and James Holt. All are subject matter experts on the issue of Taiwan and China, and agree that China's military strength is not sufficient to

reunite Taiwan by force. They are also in agreement that China's military capability is expanding rapidly and somewhere between 2005-2015, China may have the capability to reunite Taiwan by force.

⁸⁵ China initiated a doctrine change in 1993 after seeing the coalition forces evict Iraq from Kuwait. China's objective is to develop a military that can deter the U.S. from assisting Taiwan, to be able to successfully attack Taiwan, or to make Taiwan believe that trying to defend against a Chinese attack would be fruitless, and therefore capitulate without a fight.

⁸⁶ Federation of American Scientists, *Introduction to the PLA*, available from, <http://www.fas.org/nuk/guide/china/agency/pla-intro.htm>. Internet; accessed 15 September 2000.

⁸⁷ June Teufel Dreyer, *The PLA and the Taiwan Strait*, available from, <http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/FPRI-063000.htm>. Internet; accessed 22 September 2000.

⁸⁸ David Shambaugh, *A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage*, available from, <http://www.comw.org/cmp/special/taiwan.html>. Internet; accessed 25 September 2000.

⁸⁹ *2000 National Defense Report Republic of China*, 57.

⁹⁰ June Teufel Dreyer, *The PLA and the Taiwan Strait*, available from, <http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/FPRI-063000.htm>. Internet; accessed 22 September 2000.

⁹¹ James H. Holt, *The China-Taiwan Military Balance*, available from, <http://www.comw.org/cmp/special/taiwan.html>. Internet; accessed 22 September 2000.

⁹² Frank W. Moore, *China's Military Capabilities*. Available from, <http://www.comw.org/cmp/>. Internet; accessed 3 October 2000. Mr. Moore did not elaborate on how many divisions it would take to invade Taiwan.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ June Teufel Dreyer, *The PLA and the Taiwan Strait*, available from, <http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/FPRI-063000.htm>. Internet; accessed 22 September 2000.

⁹⁶ Richard Fisher and Paul H.B. Goodwin. "Session 4: Defense Policy and Posture," In *Strategic Trends in China*, ed. Hans Binnendijk and Ronald N. Montaperto (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1998), 62.

⁹⁷ Van Vranken Hickey, *Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System*, 50.

⁹⁸ Arthur Shu-fan Ding and Alexander Chie-cheng, "Taiwan's military in the 21st Century: Redefinition and Reorganization, in *The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century*, ed. Larry M Wortzel (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 254.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 271.

¹⁰⁰ *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, China and Northeast Asia: December 1999-May 2000* (United Kingdom, 1999), 517.

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- ¹⁰¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰² Federation of American Scientists, *The Republic of China's Army*, available from, <http://www.fas.org/nuk/guide/china/agency/pla-intro.htm>. Internet; accessed 15 September 2000.
- ¹⁰³ *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, China and Northeast Asia: December 1999-May 2000*, 517.
- ¹⁰⁴ David Shambaugh, *A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage*, available from, <http://www.comw.org/cmp/special/taiwan.html>. Internet; accessed 25 September 2000.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁶ Dreyer, "Taiwan's Military: A View from Afar," in *The Chinese Armed Force in the 21st Century*, 300-308. Mainland China also places political pressure on foreign countries to prevent them from selling submarines to Taiwan.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁸ *2000 National Defense Report Republic of China*, 131.
- ¹⁰⁹ Dreyer, "Taiwan's Military: A View from Afar," in *The Chinese Armed Force in the 21st Century*, 300-307.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹¹ *In Taiwan a Sudden Departure*, available from, <http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/niu2000/100400.asp>. Internet; accessed 20 October 2000.
- ¹¹² Dreyer, "Taiwan's Military: A View from Afar," in *The Chinese Armed Force in the 21st Century*, 300-307.
- ¹¹³ PACOM cannot affect equipment shortages; the Taiwan Relations Act provides for the sale of equipment to Taiwan, however they can train the Taiwan military on U.S. equipment to be more proficient. They can also train the Taiwan officers on joint operations, combined operations, and ethics and help develop safety programs. All are critical to developing Taiwan's deterrence capability.
- ¹¹⁴ Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Command and General Staff College, *Peacetime Military Engagement (PME)/Theater Engagement Planning*, available from, <http://www.-cgsc.army.mil/djco/jug/tep.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 October 2000. As stated in the section on theater engagement planning, the country, if economically possible must pay the appropriate share of the TEP; TEP is not free, however, the CINC can decide to share the cost with the host nation.
- ¹¹⁵ *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, China and Northeast Asia: December 1999-May 2000*, 555-557.
- ¹¹⁶ *Taiwan: Struggling Economy Helping KMT Erode President's Support*, available from, <http://www.stratfor.com/asia/default.htm>. Internet; accessed 22 October 2000.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning*, 31 May 2000, A1-C14. Although briefly discussed in the manual, the author had to extrapolate the intent to analyze the political condition of the country.

¹¹⁸ *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, China and Northeast Asia: December 1999-May 2000*, 499.

¹¹⁹ Van Vranken Hickey, *Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System*, 95.

¹²⁰ *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, China and Northeast Asia: December 1999-May 2000*, 501.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Chapter three discusses U.S. policy towards Taiwan, and recommends that the PACOM planner be careful not to precipitate a Mainland China attack; if China believes Taiwan will become a base of operations for the U.S., it may attack. Moreover, not to give Taiwan false hopes of U.S. intervention in the event Taiwan requests independence; China stated emphatically that any request for independence will bring an attack. Finally, not to further strain the U.S-China relationship. During President Clinton's tenure, he has worked to secure a better relationship with China. Specifically, working for China to have a permanent trade relationship with the U.S.

¹²³ The author verified with Mr. Geoff Babb, instructor and China expert at CGSC, that U.S. policy has not changed. The author also confirmed through policy documents that "One China" is still the U.S. policy.

¹²⁴ The commander's intent provides subordinate units key tasks and identifies a clear end state. The monograph's author contends that the neither the NSS nor the JSCP provide planners with key tasks and a clear end state.

¹²⁵ As discussed in chapter one, *Joint Publication 3-16* only provides a short paragraph on what TEP should accomplish; *Joint Publication 3-07.1* provides JTTP for the foreign internal defense program. DOD published *Joint Publication 3-07.1* in 1996, and the concept for TEP originated in 1997, therefore, most of the information does not assist the planner.

¹²⁶ The planner may use *FM 101-5* to conduct mission analysis, but what the planner actually requires is joint doctrine.

¹²⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning*, 31 May 2000, 2.

¹²⁸ As seen in the Taiwan case study, understanding U.S. policy, commitments and obligations would affect and potentially limit the type and amount of operational engagement activities

¹²⁹ Because no Asian country diplomatically recognizes Taiwan, the planner could not expect to have multilateral exercises with Taiwan.

¹³⁰ The author believes the four areas provide a basic framework for TEP, but needs augmentation with the three additional criteria.

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